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STATEMENT OF FACTS

The factual picture involved in this subject case
1s without dispute for the purposes of this appeal.
They are contained in the Amended Complaint of thl'
plaintiff as filed in this proceeding.
The plaintiff purchased a factory for the manufacture and repair of guns which factory was situated
in Trinidad, Colorado. Plaintiff was in the market
to obtain a lease on premises in Salt Lake City, Utah,
to which this factory could be moved and installed.
Thereafter one Robert P. Woolley, a real estate
agent and broker brought the plaintiff and defendant
together to discuss a lease on property situated at 1·3-34
South Second "\Vest Street, Salt Lake City, Utah.
During the course negotiations concerning the
lease of the property Mr. Wycoff, the defendant,
represented to the plaintiff that he owned the said
prernises, and on or about the 9th day of August entered into an oral lease agreement, the terms of
which are set out in the Amended Complaint of the
plaintiff.
Thereafter the defendant, Mr. \!Vycoff, in the
presence of the plaintiff instructed his attorney to
draw up a written lease covering the agreement as
made.
Defendant exercised other rights of ownership in
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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the property over a period of the next few weeks, as
indicated by the amended complaint, and at all times
led the plaintiff to believe, that the defendant was in
fact the owner of the property, and that the property
was under lease to plaintiff and that a written evidence of that lease would be forthcoming.
Based upon the presentations made by the
defendant, plaintiff went into possession of the
property and caused the factory and equipment heretofore mentioned to be brought upon the premises and
installed thereon.
As an actual fact, it later developed that the defendant, Mr. Wycoff, was not the owner of the property, that he was negotiating for the purchase thereof, and that he subsequently terminated his agreement to purchase the property from its owner. It
appears that the election to not proceed with the purchase was a matter of defendants own volition, the
seller having remained willing t_o carry out the terms
of the agreement.
The plaintiff did not discover the facts with
reference to the true ownership of the real property
until some time after the installation of his gun
factory in the premises.
Upon discovery of the facts as indicated above,
the plaintiff was faced with the problem of either
removing his gun factory from the premises at conSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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siderable expense to himself or negotiating with the
true owner of the property, Bessie Friedman. Plaintiff
was not informed of the decision of the Defendant not
to purchase the property until approximately Septenlber 1·1, 19-51, and prior to that time at all times
thought that the defendant was the owner of the
property.
After the discovery in reference to ownership,
the extreme cost in both time and money which
would be necessitated in the event of another movP
of the equipment, its dismanteling and reinstallation,
plaintiff negotiated the best possible lease he could
with Bessie Friedman.
The damages which appellant seeks herein repl~e
sent the increased cost and charges in connection with
the Friedman lease, together with the additional expenses which plaintiff was required to undertake
under the Friedman lease, and which were in excess
of the expenditures .required under the lease with
the defendant.
For the convenience of the Court, and since on
motion for summary judgment the facts as plead
constitute the facts of the case, plaintiff sets out
hereinafter the pertinent facts of his Amended Complaint.
1. That on or a bout August 9, 1q-s1, defendant
represented to plaintiff that he was the owner of
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certain premises at 1554 South Second West Street,
Salt Lake City, Utah, and that he had purchased the
same from Bessie Friedman and was in control and
possession thereof; that on or about the said 9th day
of August, 1951, plaintiff and defendant entered into
an oral lease agreement by the terms of which defendant leased to the plaintiff the said premises for
a period of ten years from date of possession at a
monthly rental of $400.00 per month, the same being
the front 12,000 square feet of a building, together
with an area for parking and access between the
building and Second vVest Street on the front and
east, defendant to install offices, show room, and toilet
accommodations in the front portion of the building
in a location and of a construction orally agreed upon
by the parties and at defendant's expense, defendant
to install a steam boiler heating system orally agreed
upon by the parties at defendant's expense, defendant to install certain electrical lines and fixtures
orally agreed upon by the parties at defendant's expense, and plaintiff to have possession on or before
September 1. 19S1.
2. That during the negotiations for the said
lease and at the time of the lease agreement aforesaid,
plaintiff informed defendant that he required the
leased premises for the operation therein of a manufacturing establishment and that plaintiff had purchased the lathes, machines and equipment for the
said factory at Trinidad, Colorado, and intended to
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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move the same into the leased premises on or beforp
September 1, 19:31.
3. That on or about August 16, 19:31, the dPfendant and the plaintiff visited the premises in conlpany with Mr. \Yayne C. Durharn, defendant's
attorney, and then and there orally agreed as to tht'
exact location for the construction of office acconlnlOdations and other improvernents to be installed by the
defendant and the defendant then and there and in
the presence of the plaintiff instructed his said
attorney to draw up and present a written lease to the
plaintiff setting forth the details of the oral agreernent
theretofore made between the parties; that the plaintiff believed that the said agreement would be reduced to writing by the defendant's attorney in accordance \Vith said instructions.
4. That on or about August 20, 1951 defendant
visited the leased premises with plaintiff and with one
Ben H. Davis, a licensed general contractor and then
and there defendant represented to plaintiff that he
was the owner of the said premises and in possession
and control thereof and in plaintiff's presence defendant employed the said contractor to install the said
offices, show roorn, toilet facilities and other improvements as agreed ·upon between the pa-rties and in
conformity with the terms of the proposed lease and
represented to the plaintiff that the same would be
installed by the said contractor at defendant's expense
and pursuant to the aforesaid lease agreement.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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:J. That further that on or about August 20,
1951, the defendant again represented to the plaintiff
that he was the purchaser and owner of the said leased premises and in control and possession of the same
and then and there and in the presence of the plaintiff
and the plaintiff's son, Don Easton and in the presence of Albert Friedman and Willie Friedman, the
sons of Bessie Friedman, frorn whom defendant had
alleged he had purchased the said property, notified
the said Albert Friedman and Willie Friedman that
the said defendant had entered into a lease agreeInent with plaintiff as herein set forth under the
terms of which plaintiff was entitled to occupy and
take possession on September 1, 1951 and then and
there instructed the said Friedmans to remove their
personal property from the leased premises and from
defendant's property and in no event later than
September 1, 1951, in order that plaintiff could move
his equipment and factory into and upon the leased
premises and occupy the same pursuant to the aforesaid lease agreement.

6. That further and on or about August 20,
1951~ defendant represented to plaintiff that he was
the purchaser and owner and in possession and control of the said leased premises and instructed the
plaintiff that he could move his equipment and
machinery and factory into and upon the leased
premises as soon as plaintiff could obtain and arrange
for transportation thereof from Trinidad, Colorado.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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7. That on or about August 13, 19·)1, the defendant stated to one Robert P. Woolley, the real
estate agent and broker who had negotiated the real
estate agreement between plaintiff and defendant~
that it would not be necessary for the said broker to
employ an attorney to reduce the oral lease agreement to writing and that the defendant had a retained company attorney, and that the defendant had
instructed and employed the said attorney to prepare a written lease agreement setting forth the terms
orally agreed on between the parties and that the
said written lease containing said terms would be
delivered to the said broker and delivered to the plaintiff; and the said Robert P. Woolley thereafter
prou1ptly reported this statement and information to
plaintiff who believed the same to be true and who
believed accordingly that a lease agreement was being prepared by defendant's attorney in conformity
vvith the oral agree1nent theretofore entered into between the parties.
8. That each of the representations and stateInents of the defendant aforesaid was made with the
full knowledge and intention that the plaintiff would
believe and rely upon the same and that in reliance
thereon plaintiff would cause his machinery and
factory and equipment to be moved from Trinidad,
Colorado, into and upon the leased premises on or
about September 1, 1951; that at all times aforeInentioned the defendant well knew that he had not
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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purchased and was not the owner of or in possession
or control of the above described leased premises and
and knew that his representations to the contrary to
the plaintiff were false and untrue; that on or about
August 21, 1951, the defendant was advised by one
Newell Dayton of Tracy Collins Trust Company that
a tax lien for unpaid taxes due from Bessie Friedman
was an outstanding encumbrance against the above
described property and instructed his attorney Wayne
C. Durham to investigate the validity of the said tax
lien; that on or about August 22, 1951, the defendant
formulated a conviction that he would not acquire the
said premises and that the title could not be cleared
from the said lien to the satisfaction of the defendant;
that notwithstanding his inforrnation and conviction
aforesaid, the defendant wholly and entirely failed
and neglected to advise or in any manner instruct the
plaintiff that he was not to move his equipment upon
the leased premises or that the defendant had determined not to complete his purchase of the premises or
that the defendant was not in fact the owner of and
entitled to the control and possession of the said
premises.
9. That by reason of the aforesaid facts, stater.aents and representations of the defendant, plaintiff
vvas induced to believe and did believe that the defendant had purchased from Bessie Friedman and was
the owner of the above described premises and in
control of the same and entitled to lease the same to
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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the plaintiff for occupancy effective Septernber 1,
1951. In accordance with such belief and understanding and in reliance upon defendant's represe_ntations and statements, plaintiff caused his
machinery and factory equipment to be moved frmn
Trinidad, Colorado into and upon the leased premises
and caused the same to be assembled and installed
therein between September 1, and September+, 1951.·
10. That thereafter and on about September 15,
1951, defendant stated to plaintiff that he had
decided not to complete_ his purchase of the leased
premises from Bessie Friedman and that the defendant would make no further written lease with plaintiff and that plaintiff was accordingly upon the Friedrnan property and not upon the property of the
defendant and that defendant had no further interest
in the property and that if plaintiff was to remain upon the property it would be necessary for him to enter
into a suitable lease or purchase agreement with the
Friedman ovvners.
11. That thereafter plaintiff negotiated a lease
agreement for the aforesaid leased premises with the
owners thereof, to-wit, Albert and Bessie Friedman,
on the best terms and conditions the plaintiff could
obtain, but that the said lease "'as less valuable to
plaintiff than the lease agreement aforesaid with
defendant, in the following particulars and with darnage to the plaintiff as folloV\·s:
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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a. Under the Fried1nan lease, plaintiff.,
rather than the landlord, was obliged to install
the required electrical lines and fixtures, and
the same were installed by plaintiff at a cost
and damage to the plaintiff in the sum of
$4,500.00.
b. Under the Friedman lease plaintiff,
rather than the landlord, was obliged to install
the offices, show room, and toilet facilities, and
the same were installed by plaintiff at a cost
and damange to plaintiff in the sum of
$4,200.00.
c. Under the Friedman lease the landlord installed a heating system which was not a
steam boiler, but was a propane gas installation, and the cost of the fuel for the said system
amounts to $300.00 per year more than the
cost of fuel for the system which defendant
agreed to install, to the damage of the plaintiff over the 10-year period of the lease in the
sum of $3,000.00
d. That the rental under the Friedman
lease is the sum of $450.00 per month, whereas the defendant agreed to lease the san1e or
better premises and appurtenances at a rental
of $400.00 per month, to the damage of the
plaintiff over the 10-year period of the lease in
the sum of $6,000.00.
12. That the fair market value of the said premises and the basis upon which they could have been
leased from the owners prior to the time plaintiff entered upon the said premises and installed his machinery and factory equipment thereon was the same basis
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at which plaintiff entered into the original oral lease
agreement with the defendant as hereinabove srt
forth in paragraph one; and that the increased cost
and charge in connection with the Friedman lease
\vas the result of plaintiff being upon the premises
with his factory at the time of negotiations for thr
said lease with the said Friedmans, and is in exn'ss
of the fair market value of the said premises, to
the damage of the plaintiff in the sum of $17,700.00
WHEREFORE, plaintiff prays judgment against
the defendant for the sum of $17,700.00, costs of suit,
interest and such other and further relief as to the
Court appears proper.
STATEMENT OF POINTS

I.

The representations made by the defendant to the plaintiff
gave rise to an estoppel in pais precluding the defendant from
asserting the Statute of Frauds as a defense. __ The trial court
erred in granting defendant's motion for summary judgment
and to dismiss.

II.

The representations made by the defendant that he could and
should take immediate possession of the property, and that
a written lease would be prepared embodying the terms of
the oral agreement, gave rise to a promissory estoppel which
precludes the defendant from asserting the Statute of Frauds
as a defense. The trial court erred in granting defendant's
motion for summary judgment and to dismiss.

Ill.

Plaintiff's complaint states a good cause of action sounding in
In tort, for fraudulent misrepresentation. The trial court erred
in granting defendant's motion for summary judgment and
to dismiss.

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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POINT I.
The representations made by the defendant gave
rise to an estoppel in pais precluding the defendant from
asserting the Statute of Frauds as a defense. The trial
court erred in granting defendant's motion for summary
judgment and to dismiss.

The Trial Court when it considered the motion
for summary judgment which it granted the defendant in this case, had before it the recent decision of the
Utah Supreme Court of Raverino us. Price (Utah) 260
Pac. 2nd. 5 70, and concluded that the Raverino case
was controlling in this case.
It is plaintiff's contention that the Raverino case
is clearly distinguishable from the case at bar, and the
principles of law enunciated therein are in fact favorable to plaintiff's position.
The matter involved, that is, the application of
the Statute of Frauds to the present situation is, of
course, paramount here as it was in the Raverino
case, although the problem involved here is a lease
of real property rather than the purchase of real
property.
Appellant takes the position that the defendant
under the facts of this case is estopped to plead or raise
as a defense, the statute of frauds, based upon the lack
of a writing herein. The principle underlying estoppel
cases under circumstances such as herein involved is
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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perhaps best stated in Utah MPITur Gold Mining
Co. v. Hershel Gold Mining Co., 103 Utah 249, 1 )·1·
P. 2nd. 1094 as follovvs:
"Whether the legalla bel given to the basis
of plaintiffs' claimed right to continue in
possession of the property is equitable estoppel,
irrevocable license, or an oral contract for a
written extension taken out of the statute of
frauds because of partial performance is not so
important. These concepts are but forms designed to serve a more ultimate principle that
no one shall induce another to act on promise
of reward for such act and then after obtaining the benefit of the same repudiate the contract."
The Court in the Raverino case had before it tlw
question of a promissory estoppel, based upon a representation as to a future event, that is, transfer of certain property. In that case the defendant obtained
no advantage from the reliance by the plaintiff upon
the representation, and in fact the change of position
that occurred was meTely the fact that the plaintiff
suffered a questionable detriment in purchasing
adjoining property in reliance upon the promise of the
defendant. Actually plaintiff in the Ravarino case
suffered no detriment since the property which he
purchased could be sold as the facts of that case indicate, for as much as he paid for the property.
This factual picture serves to point out the very
broad difference which distinguishes the case' at bar.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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In the present case the defendant was in fact
negotiating for the purchase of the property located
at .1554 South Second West, and the advantage to be
gained by him, arising out of his representation as to
his ownership of the premises, and representation as
to the lease of the premises is very clear. By making
these representations, he in fact secured a tenant for
the property so that upon his purchase thereof he
would suffer no· period of loss of rental of the
property, but in fact had a substantial tenant on the
pren1ises from the date of his purchase of the
property. The detriment to the plaintiff is, of course:
very clear. Having placed himself in a position in
reliance upon the representations of the defendant
where he could be greatly injured, he had no alternative but to negotiate with the true owner of the
premises on the best basis which it was possible for
him to obtain, after discovery of the misrepresentations.
The situation then was one where the party to
whom the representations were made, relied upon
them; the representations were made for the purpose
of obtaining the reliance of the plaintiff thereon, and
they were done by the defendant for his own advantage.
Whereas in the Raverino case the defendant
(seller) obtained no advantage by the representation since he had no interest in the "Terry Strip" beSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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ing purchased or not purchased, in the present C<ls(•
the lessor obtained a very valuable advantage, had he
elected to proceed as he represented to the plaintiff,
that he had done.
It appears that the estoppel hPre involved is in
fact a true estoppel based upon misrepresentation of
an existing fact. The misrepresentation being: 1. A
misrepresentation as to ownership and right to lease
the same; 2. A misrepresentation as to the state of
rnind of the defendant when he instructed his
attorney to draft the lease.

',dH

:n]
,,(o
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The first misrepresentation is clearly one of an
existing fact, and which was false.
The second misrepresentation was a nlisrepresentation as to the state of mind of the defendant,
that is, an indication to the plaintiff that a lease
would be drawn by his attorney when in fact he had
no such fixed intention and vvhen in fact he knew
that he could not have such a fixed intention since
at that time he had no actual proper right to give
such a lease. For this reason appellant takes the position that this latter misrepresentation undoubtedly
makes a misrepresentation as to the state of mind
under which the defendant vvas proceeding. This
would bring the case \vithin the rule announced in
the case Elliott v. Whitmore, 23 Utah 342, 65 Pac. 70.
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POINT II.
The representations made by the defendant that he
could take immediate possession and that the written
lease would be prepared, gave rise to a promissory
estoppel which precluded the defendant from asserting
the Statute of Frauds as a defense. The trial court erred in
granting defendant's motion for summary judgment and
to dismiss.

For the purpose of this appeal it is immaterial
whether the estoppel actually constituted an estoppel
in pais or whether the estoppel is a promissory
estoppel. That is to say, the facts justify the use of
the doctrine of promissory estoppel as a means of
granting the plaintiff relief.
The application of the doctrine of promissory
estoppel is well illustrated by the case of Interstate
Company us. Bry-Block Mercantile Company, 30 Fed
2nd. 172. In that ca~e relief was granted the plaintiff
under circumstances where the President of the
defendant corporation had told the plaintiff that he
would sjgn the contract of lease involved and requested them to act as though the contract was
already signed and urged them to proceed with the
opening of a business in the premises. Based upon
these facts the plaintiff took possession, bought
Hxtures and made improvements on the premises.
The analogy to the case at bar is clear. The
plaintiff relied upon the representations of the
defendant that he could take possession of the premSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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Another case illustrating the same principal is
the case of Seymour vs. Oelrichs, 1:56 Cal. 782, 106
Pac. 88. In that case the Court allowed a recovery on
a contract where the plaintiff gave up a life position
to work for the defendant on the promise of the
defendant to execute a written ten year employment
contract, and not to rely on the statute of frauds. The
court held in substance that it was manifest fraud
which justified the application of the doctrine of
equitable estoppel. See also Hunter l'S. Sparling
· (Calif.) 197 Pac. 807; Tchula Commerce Co. vs. Jackson, 1+7 Miss. 296, 111 Southern 8 7+.
The Trial Court had in mind the dicta announced
by the Supreme Court in the Raverino case, and consequently was reluctant to review this matter favorably from the standpoint of the cases cited above.
It is submitted by the plaintiff that the reasons
for the extension of the doctrine of promissory
estoppel to the extent recognized by 2 vVilliston
(Revised Edition) 1554, Section 333 are compelling,
and in the present case should certainly be reviewed
favorably by the Court. At the above citation the
author states as follows:

"Doctrine of promissory estoppel has always been extended to permit recovery on the
contract by one \vho has relied to his detriment
on the pron1ise of the defendant to execute and
deliver a sufficient memorandum."
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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The principal is enunciated clearly in the Restatement of Contracts, Section 90, wherein it is said:
"A promise which the promisor should
reasonably expect to produce action or forbearance of a definite and substantial character on the part of the promisee and which
thus induces such action or forbearance is
binding if injustice can be avoided only be enforcement of the promise."
The injustice involved in the present case is such
that the Court should estop the defendant from pleading or relying upon the statute of frauds and allow
the enforcement of the present suit for damages. The
plaintiff expended large sums of money, bound himself to an unsatisfactory contract of lease requiring
payment of more monies than the property was
reasonably worth, simply because he was at the
mercy of the owner of the property. This situation
was created by the misrepresentation of the defendant, that he owned the property, that the plaintiff
should take possession thereof, and that a written
lease would follo·w.
The election on the part of the defendant not to
proceeed with the purchase of the property placed
the plaintiff in this unsatisfactory situation, yet the
plaintiff was relying upon representations of the
defendant, and the defendant had the advantage of
a tenant in possession if, as and when he elected to
proceed with the contract of purchase. Since he volunSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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tarily withdrew from the purchase of the property, he
certainly should not be allowed to claim that the
benefit was not actually realized because he did not
become the owner of the leased premises. As stated in
Seymour v. Oelrichs, 156 Cal. 782, 106 P. 88:

.1111
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"Here certainly ... was a representation
of a future intention absolute in form, deliberately made for the purpose of influencing
the conduct of the other party ... "
''While the question is by no means free
from doubt, we believe that it should be held
that there were sufficient facts to support a
conclusion that the promise here to give such
a written agreement as was required by the
statute was made under such circumstances
that the irrevocable surrender by plaintiff of
his position in the police department in full
reliance thereon made it, in the eye of equity,
a binding contract, the subsequent repudiation
of which by defendants would constitute such
a manifest fraud as would justify the application of the doctrine of equitable estoppel."
As stated by Chief Justice Wolfe in the Raverino
case in discussing this point:
"The binding thread which runs through
these cases, distinguishing them from the general rule that a mere promise as to future conduct will not work an estoppel, is the promise
designedly made to influence the conduct of
pro1nisee ... "
Citalics Added)
The assertion of the defendant that his counsel
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would draw up the lease, and that the written lease
\Yould be forthcoming, place this case on a parallel
\Yith the Interstate Company vs. Bry-Block Mer. Co.
case, 30 Fed. 2d. 172, and the Seymour vs. Oelrichs,
case, 156 Cal. 782, 106 P. 88. It is earnestly submitted
that the case at bar factually is exactly the situation
about which Chief Justice \Volfe wrote when he
penned the language quoted above.
POINT III.
Plaintiff's. complaint states a good cause of action
sounding in tort, for fraudulent misrepresentation. The
trial court erred in granting defendant's motion for summary judgment and to dismiss.

Appellant believes and asserts that his amended
cmnplaint states a cause of action sounding in tort,
thatjs a cause of action for fraud and deceit stemming
from the misrepresentations made him by the respondent with the intent that he rely there on, and
relied up0n to his detriment.
Under such a view of the case, the Statute of
Frauds has no effect or bearing on the case, and is not
assertable as a defense thereto.
That the representations made by the defendant
with respect to his ownership of the property were
representations as to existing n1atters of fact is clear.
As alleged by the complaint, and for the purpose of
this appeal, to be taken as true, the defendant asserted
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to the plaintiff that he had purchased the property
from Bessie Freidman, that he was in control of the
property, and that he could and did lease the property
to the plaintiff .. Plaintiff took possession of the
property in reliance thereon, as the defendant intended that he should, and suffered extreme damages
because of the false statements knowingly made by
the defendant.
As stated in 23 Am. Jur. 816, sec. 50:
"The general rule is well settled that false
statements or representations as to the title, or
the character of one's title to real estate, made
for the purpose of inducing some business
transaction or dealing in coniJ.ection therewith,
constitute actionable fraud, and may be the
basis ... for an action in tort for damages ... "
The general rule ... has been applied to a false
representation by the representer that h!has
a good title when in fact he has no title ...
This principle also applies to false representations or statements as to ownership.
It is equally clear, that for the purpose of proceeding at law for damages for the fraudulent misrepresentations, that the representations and the
contract entered into are distinct and separable, 23
Am. Jur. 776, sec. 23.
For the purpose of this appeal, the damages
suffered by the plaintiff under this theory is the
difference between the fair rental price which the
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property would and should have brought under
normal circumstances, and the price which plaintiff
was required to pay by reason of the fact that the
defendant through his fraudulent misrepresentations
placed the plaintiff in a position where he could be
and was seriously injured.
CONCLUSION

It is respectfully and earnestly asserted by the
Appellant that he has suffered great damage in his
business operations by reason of the activities and
representations of the Respondent, as more particularly set forth herein, and that those representations
were made under circumstances calculated to be for
the benefit of the Respondent in making the same;
that it would be highly unjust to allow the Respondent to be freed from the responsibility that should
attend the making of those representations, by affirming the holding of the lower court. It is further
asserted that the factual basis justifying the award
of damages based upon those representations is amply
established by plaintiff's complaint. The trial court
felt constrained to follow the interpretation which
he placed upon the Ravarino case, the Appellant feels
that in this the trial court erred. In legal principle
the Ravarino case supports Appellant in this case,
and factually the cases are clearly distinguishable.
In the Ravarino case there is a discussion of promissory estoppel without any definite conclusion thereon,
but indicated the basis therefor. The discussion
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appears to be in the form of dicta, since the case is
decided upon another point, that is, that the elements
of a promissory estoppel are lacking. In the present
case, those elements are present, and it is earnestly
asserted that the facts justify the upholding of plaintiff's complaint on any of the theories thereof asserted
by plaintiff.
Respectfully submitted,
OWEN, WARD, SHEFFIELD
& GREENWOOD
Attorneys for Appellant
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